Abstract-Tactical wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are deployed over a region of interest for mission centric operations. The sink node in a tactical WSN is the aggregation point of data processing. Due to its essential role in the network, the sink node is a high priority target for an attacker who wishes to disable a tactical WSN. This paper focuses on the mitigation of sink-node vulnerability in a tactical WSN. Specifically, we study the issue of protecting the sink node through a technique known as k-anonymity. To achieve k-anonymity, we use a specific routing protocol designed to work within the constraints of WSN communication protocols, specifically IEEE 802.15.4. We use and modify the Lightweight Ad hoc On-Demand Next Generation (LOADng) reactive-routing protocol to achieve anonymity. This modified LOADng protocol prevents an attacker from identifying the sink node without adding significant complexity to the regular sensor nodes. We simulate the modified LOADng protocol using a custom-designed simulator in MATLAB. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our protocol and also show some of the performance tradeoffs that come with this method.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) contains multiple nodes which act as sensing devices and routers. A tactical WSN has different priorities than a WSN used for civilian applications. A tactical WSN is generally deployed in hostile or austere environments where the intentional compromise of nodes is quite high. Specifically, a tactical WSN requires situational awareness of its environment, more so than a WSN that is used commercially. The versatility of remote sensors has made them especially appealing for use in the United States Marine Corps (USMC). The USMC Publication (MCRP) 210A.5 on remote sensor operations [1] details the ways and means in which sensor operations are conducted in the United States Marine Corps (USMC). The sink node of a tactical WSN is the central node to which data is sent by other sensor nodes for processing.
The open nature of the WSN environment allows nodes to be easily compromised, leading to several security problems. In particular, the sink node, which is the aggregation point of all network data, is considered a single point of failure. An attack that compromises the sink node results in the network becoming isolated and non-functioning. This makes the sink node the priority node for an adversary to locate and disable.
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A. Motivations and Contributions
The USMC employs the AN/GSQ-261 Tactical Remote Sensor System (TRSS) for remote sensor operations within an area of interest. While the AN/GSQ-261 is a capable system that enhances the capabilities of the USMC, it is large and requires sensor nodes to be manually placed, potentially putting personnel at risk if placed forward of friendly lines. There is a potential for smaller and more resource-constrained devices, which can easily be air dropped into an area or placed in large numbers by units on patrol. These devices can provide similar remote sensing capability as the AN/GSQ-261's sensor nodes while being much more cost effective and expendable. There are a wide range of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions that can economically provide this capability with minor modifications [2] .
Power-friendly communication protocols such as IEEE 802.15.4 are prime candidates for maintaining connectivity in WSNs. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard is a data link and physical layer protocol that provides communications between low-power devices [3] . Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) over IEEE 802.15.4 low-power wireless personal area networks (6LoWPAN) was later developed to address interoperability between low power lossy networks and IPv6-enabled networks. 6LoWPAN is an open networking standard that provides compatibility between existing Internet-connected devices and low-power WSNs. It allows for IP packets to be carried within IEEE 802.15.4 link layer frames by reducing the overhead associated with the IPv6 protocol.
In this paper, we focus on the mitigation of sink node vulnerability in a WSN used at the tactical edge by the U.S. Marine Corps. We study the issue of protecting the sink node through anonymity techniques. In particular, we use a technique known as k-anonymity to obfuscate the actual sink node. To achieve k-anonymity, we use a specific routing protocol designed to work within the constraints of IEEE 802.15.4 and 6LoWPAN. We modify the Lightweight Ad hoc On-Demand Next Generation (LOADng) reactive routing protocol.
The contribution of this paper is the development of a modified LOADng routing protocol that provides k-anonymity to the sink node while limiting the computational overhead for the sensor nodes. To the best of our knowledge, this approach to sink-node anonymity has not been accomplished utilizing a reactive, or on-demand, routing protocol.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. The related work is discussed in Section II. Section III discusses the LOADng protocol. Section IV describes k-anonymity and how it is implemented using LOADng. Sections V and VI detail the experimental setup and simulation results and analysis. We conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
One of the simplest anonymity schemes involves injecting false packets into the network to deceive an adversary by making it difficult to recognize traffic patterns. The authors of [4] proposed a method called fractal propagation to create false packets in a WSN. This method creates a lot of unneeded traffic and may still not provide anonymity to the sink node because of the uncontrolled routing of the fake packets. The authors add more routing control to the scheme to create pockets of increased traffic, but this increases the complexity of the routing algorithm.
One approach to hiding the location of the sink node is to route traffic to nodes that act as decoy sink nodes. This hides the sink node from a global adversary because the traffic never actually traverses the sink node. Base-station Location Anonymity and Security Technique (BLAST) [5] utilizes a ring of nodes around the sink node that act as endpoints for the traffic to the sink node. When a node sends traffic, it chooses one of the blast nodes to act as the endpoint, which then transmits the packet with a range that covers all of the other blast nodes and the sink node. This creates a ring of protective nodes around the sink node, masking the identity of the sink node. This provides anonymity for the sink node from a global attacker but adds computational burden to the nodes and does not account for how the routes are learned.
The authors of [6] and [7] segment their networks into clusters and utilize cluster heads (CHs) to act as the gateway for traffic leaving each cluster. CH routing is a common technique used in WSNs and can have the advantage of saving energy in a flat topology [6] . This approach provides anonymity for the sink node among the members of its cluster but assumes that the nodes have the ability to elect their CHs and the CHs have the ability to build routes through adjacent CHs. This requires additional computational capabilities for all nodes that may become CHs, which increases cost and energy consumption.
Implementation of security algorithms like encryption and authentication for tactical WSNs using IEEE 802.15.4/6LoW-PAN was studied in [8] . However, sink node vulnerability was an accepted risk and not discussed.
III. OVERVIEW OF LOADNG ROUTING PROTOCOL
The LOADng routing protocol is a reactive routing protocol developed for use in Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) and is currently a draft at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Network Working Group [9] . It was derived from the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol, which was originally published in 2003 in Request for Comments (RFC) 3561 by the IETF. 6LoWPAN Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing (LOAD) was the first derivative of AODV developed by the 6LoWPAN working group. LOAD was designed as a Layer-2 mesh under protocol and was designated as the routing protocol for utility metering networks by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in recommendation ITU-T G.9903. LOADng was created as an improvement to LOAD that also offered the ability to work as a Layer-3 route over protocol [10] . The ITU superseded LOAD with LOADng in the recommendation ITU-T G.9903 in May 2013.
A. LOADng Performance Comparisons
As the name implies, LOADng is a lightweight protocol designed for use in devices that are resource constrained. It eliminates some of the functions of AODV while maintaining the core ability to provide end-to-end routing efficiently. In AODV, each node maintains a precursor list, which has the IP addresses of all other nodes that it thinks will use it as a next hop to all destinations. LOADng does not have precursor lists and only cares about its next hop to a destination, reducing the memory requirement in the sensor nodes.
AODV allows an intermediate node to respond to a route request (RREQ) if it has a route to the destination. LOADng only allows the destination to respond to RREQs, which serves to lower the amount of network traffic and simplifies the protocol. This tends to further highlight the sink node since all route replies (RREPs) come from the sink node, assuming the traffic from the sensors is all destined for the sink node.
LOADng allows for protocol extensions through the use of Type-Length-Value (TLV) elements, making it possible to provide additional functionality to the protocol. The ability to modify LOADng is a key characteristic and one of the main reasons it was chosen for the application discussed in this paper.
LOADng was chosen for this research due to its low resource overhead for sensor nodes and its good performance compared to other WSN routing protocols. When compared to the Routing Protocol for Low-power and Lossy Networks (RPL), a proactive routing-distance vector protocol for power constrained devices, it was found that LOADng showed significantly lower network overhead while maintaining a better PDR and average path length [10] . When compared to AODV, LOADng showed better PDR and significantly less routing overhead in multi-point to point scenarios, which is how a military tactical sensor network operates.
B. LOADng Operation
As a reactive routing protocol, LOADng accomplishes route discovery through the use of RREQ, RREP, and RREP acknowledge (RREP ACK) packets.
1) Route Requests:
When a node has data it needs to send to another node, the source node first determines whether it has a route-tuple to the destination node in its routing set. Each tuple contains the next-hop node address and the routing metric used to obtain the route towards the destination [9] . The default routing metric used in LOADng is hop count. If there is a route, the source node simply unicasts a data packet to the destination node. If there is no route in the routing set, the source node generates a RREQ packet and floods the RREQ packet to its neighbors. The RREQ packet is flooded through the entire network until all nodes have received the packet or the packet hop limit is exceeded. When each node receives the RREQ, the node updates its routing set by updating an existing route-tuple or adding a new tuple with a route to the source address in the RREQ. This generates the reverse route, as each node receiving the RREQ generates a route-tuple to the source node. The node then checks the destination address to determine if it is the destination. If it is not the destination, the node continues flooding the RREQ in accordance with the flooding scheme implemented.
2) Route Replies: If the node is the destination, it generates a RREP message and unicasts it back to the source via the reverse route. As each node receives the RREP, it similarly updates or creates a tuple in its routing set with a route to the RREP originator. This creates the forward route toward the RREP source node. The node then determines if it is the destination for the RREP. If it is not the destination, the node forwards the RREP packet based on the reverse route generated in the RREQ flooding that was executed previously. An example of the RREQ and RREP process for the LOADng protocol with the route numbers showing the hop count from the source is shown in Figure 1 . 
3) Route Reply Acknowledgments and Route Errors:
If it is the destination of the RREP, the node generates a RREP ACK packet and unicasts it to the source of the RREP via the forward route. If the node has data to send, it then sends the data to the destination node via the same forward route.
If any node in the route determines that the route is broken at any time, it generates a Route Error (RERR) message and unicasts it back to the source node of the packet it was attempting to forward. Upon receipt of the RERR, the source node sends a new RREQ to establish a new forward route to the destination.
IV. SINK NODE ANONYMITY USING LOADNG
Reactive routing protocols present a unique challenge to the problem of masking the identity of the sink node. As discussed previously, the act of route discovery through the flooding of RREQ packets and the RREP response quickly highlights the sink node; however, reactive protocols offer distinct advantages in their lower computational overhead and power consumption when compared to proactive protocols [11] , [12] . In order to obfuscate the identity of the sink node, the traffic to the sink node must be indistinguishable from a set of other nodes in the network. In the following sections, we discuss the scheme used to anonymize the sink node as well as the modification to the LOADng routing protocol to achieve that anonymity.
A. k-Anonymity k-Anonymity was first proposed in 2002 [13] . The original premise of the theory related to protecting the identity of patients in a database by ensuring that accessible data does not link a specific record to an individual person. By taking steps to ensure none of the personal information uniquely identifies an individual within the set of patients, a level of anonymity is provided to the patients.
B. k-Anonymity in Sensor Networks
For k-anonymity in a tactical WSN, we assume that the attacker knows limited information about the network traffic because the communications are encrypted at the MAC layer; however, the attacker could begin to build a basic understanding of the types of traffic in the network from passively observing the traffic. Passive observation enables one to determine the types of traffic based on the length of the transmission time, number of bits in a packet, and the order of transmissions between nodes. Our design does not assume that the nodes have prior knowledge of the network layout or the ability to determine their physical location. The only assumption is that the nodes know the address of the sink node and have been configured with the same symmetric encryption key prior to deployment.
1) Identification of the Sink Node Through Passive Observation:
The transmission times for LOADng packets encapsulated in IEEE 802.15.4 frames using the maximum IEEE 802.15.4 transmission speed of 250 kbps is shown in Table I . We assume that the frames are not padded and the network is encrypting the traffic at Layer 2 using AES-128, so there is no change to the frame size. A full frame for IEEE 802.15.4 is limited to 127 bytes [3] . The frame header is 25 bytes and the encryption overhead is 21 bytes, leaving 81 bytes for the frame payload [3] .
In a WSN, it is assumed that the majority of the traffic is destined for the sink node; therefore, a majority of the RREQs that are sent have the sink node as the destination. Once the RREQs are received, the sink node does not forward RREQs any further. If this is the case, the majority of the RREP packets originate from the sink node, and the majority of the RREP ACK and data packets are destined for the sink node. By observing the traffic and determining the ratio of the RREPs sent to the RREQs forwarded, the attacker can determine where the majority of packets are destined and conclude that this is the sink node. Additionally, once the network has converged and the majority of traffic is data to the sink node, it is easy for an attacker to determine the sink node.
2) Obscuring the Sink Node through k-Anonymity:
The kanonymity principle in a WSN seeks to prevent sink node identification by having at least one node act similarly to the sink node. By altering the traffic patterns, we find it is possible to change the behavior of the sink node and its neighbor nodes so that they are similar enough to be indistinguishable to an attacker. As k increases, sink node identification becomes more difficult.
Let N be the set of all nodes and N SN be the set of nodes that include the sink node and its one-hop neighbors where N SN ⊆ N . If the sink node is indistinguishable from the other nodes in N SN , then k = N SN . We determine the distinguishability of the sink node by looking at two parameters: the total number of transmissions and the ratio of RREP to RREQ packets sent for each node in N SN . With these numbers, we can measure the standard deviation among the nodes to determine how easy it is to identify the sink node among its neighbors. Using T SNi as the number of transmissions or the ratio of RREP to RREQ packets for node N SNi and μ SN as the mean number of transmissions, we can calculate the standard deviation as
where
If the number of sink node transmissions and the ratio of RREP to RREQ packets are both within one standard deviation of the mean μ SN , then the sink node cannot be distinguished from its neighbor nodes and is considered k-anonymous where k = N SN . With T S as the number of transmissions or the ratio of RREP to RREQ packets for the sink node, the sink is kanonymous if it satisfies the inequality
C. Modified LOADng for Sink Node Anonymity
As noted previously, the sink node is particularly vulnerable to identification, even if the traffic is encrypted because a majority of the traffic in the network is destined for this node. By observing the frequency of the transmissions from the node, an adversary can quickly determine the importance of the node and determine with a high level of certainty that this is, at the very least, a high priority node.
Our scheme works by developing a zone of regular nodes around the sink node. The nodes within this zone act as false endpoints for the traffic. The nodes that are one hop neighbors to the sink node are chosen to be part of the zone. This is because the one hop neighbors are within transmission range of the sink node, thereby allowing the sink node to have knowledge about the various routes each of its one-hop neighbors has in its routing set.
1) Choosing a Neighbor Node:
Since all nodes in the network build their knowledge of the network through the use of RREQ packets, it is critical for efficient routing that some RREQ packets from the source node(s) reach the sink node. The sink node must have an understanding of which of its neighbor nodes have active routes to the node requesting a route (source node). In order to ensure this, the sink node must not respond to the first RREQ it receives from each node in the network. The sink node sees which of its neighbors have forwarded the RREQ and knows that this neighbor node has a route to the source node. When the timeout for the RREQ expires, the source node floods another RREQ packet through the network.
When the sink node receives the second RREQ from this source node, it looks in its routing set and finds all nodes, including itself, which have a route to the source. Of these, it excludes those nodes that the sink node knows have already forwarded the new RREQ. This is critical because if a node is seen forwarding a RREQ and then sending a RREP, an adversary might assume that this node is not the sink node. From the nodes that are left, including itself, the sink node chooses one node to act as the sink node.
2) Forwarding the Altered RREQ and Sending the RREP: If the sink node does not choose itself, it alters the RREQ packet by changing the destination address to the chosen neighbor node and setting the sink flag in the packet. This flag tells the chosen neighbor node that it is acting as the sink node and relays to the source node that any future packets destined for the sink node need to go to this address. The sink node then continues flooding the altered RREQ, acting as a normal node. When the chosen neighbor node receives the RREQ, it creates a RREP packet with the sink flag set and unicasts it back to the source node. If the sink node chooses itself, it creates a RREP packet with the sink flag set and unicasts it back to the source node. An example of the RREQ and RREP packets is shown in Figure 2 with link numbers indicating the hop count from the source node. The addition of the sink flag to the RREP, RREP ACK, and data packets is accomplished through a protocol extension enabled by TLV elements. The extension adds an additional TLV element of type FLAGS as defined in [9] to the RREP ACK and data headers since the RREP already contains the TLV. Bits 1 to 7 are reserved for future use in this TLV, allowing us to use bit 1 for the sink flag. RREQ packets do not require the addition of the sink flag since it is not used in the route discovery process. A RREP header with the FLAGS TLV is shown in Figure 3 . The Values field contains the eight bits used in this TLV. 3) RREP ACK and Data Packets: Upon receiving the RREP, the source node first sends a RREP ACK to the source address in the RREP. It then sends its data packet(s) to the same address. Upon receipt of a data packet, the destination node, whether the actual sink node or a chosen neighbor, sends a broadcast of the data packet with the sink flag set. All neighbor nodes see the broadcast, but only the actual sink node accepts the packet since the sink flag is set. It is important that the actual sink node also broadcast if it is the destination to ensure that it is behaving the same as the fake sink nodes.
V. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
All simulations were designed and run in a custom simulator built in MATLAB. The simulator is designed to simulate any number of sensor nodes in either a uniform spacing or a random distribution. This flexibility allows the testing of the effectiveness of the modified LOADng protocol in the scenarios of deliberate or random placement of nodes.
We simulated an area of size 500 x 500 m 2 . Many available COTS IEEE 802.15.4 transmitters that operate at 1-dBm transmit power have a maximum unimpeded line-of-sight range up to 100.0 m. Accordingly, we chose the transmission range of the nodes to be 50.0 m. We deployed 250 nodes for the random distribution and 196 nodes for the uniform distribution. For simplicity, we assume the nodes are stationary. For the uniform spacing, 196 nodes was chosen because it provides an even 14x14 sensor node field. Examples from the MATLAB simulator of the uniform and random distributions of sensor nodes are shown in Figure 4 . The custom designed simulator incorporated basic functions like CSMA/CA and jitter. Jitter is a simple, effective way to reduce the number of collisions during the flooding of RREQ packets during route discovery [14] . When measuring power consumption, we assumed that nodes are in three general states: idle, receiving, and transmitting. Receiving and transmitting encompass all functions to go from the idle state, complete their task, and return to the idle state. In Table II , the power consumption values used to determine power usage during the transmit and receive phases are shown.
In addition to the above power consumption, we need to account for the power consumed during the cryptographic key setup, encryption, and decryption for AES-128. This must be taken into account at each node since the encryption is executed at the MAC layer. Every node needs to decrypt each packet it receives and encrypts each packet it transmits. The power used by a node during the encryption and decryption phases is shown in Table III .
The metrics measured in the simulation are:. [15] . 1) Sink node anonymity: We define the sink node as anonymous if the number of transmissions sent and the ratio of RREPs sent to RREQs forwarded for the sink node are within one standard deviation of the mean of the same metrics for its neighbors. 2) Power consumption: During the simulation, the simulator maintains a running count of the number of times each node attempts to transmit, completes a transmission, and the total time each node is transmitting. These values are used with the values in Tables II and III to determine the total power used by each node in the network. 3) PDR: Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) is determined based on the number of total unicast packets originated and the number of total unicast packets received by nodes in the network.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The simulations were run for a uniform spacing of 196 nodes and a random distribution of 250 nodes. Under each scenario, simulations were run using 500, 1000, and 2000 transmissions from nodes to the sink node. The transmission order of the nodes and the time spacing were randomly generated.
In this section, we present the results of the anonymity test for the modified LOADng protocol and compare the results to the standard LOADng protocol. The results presented for each number of transmissions in both sections represent the results from the same simulations.
A. Number of Transmissions
The number of individual transmissions completed for each node was tracked separately during the modified LOADng and LOADng simulations. A completed transmission means a single node completes the transmission of one packet to a neighbor node. Transmissions that were incomplete due to a collision are not counted in the numbers. The transmission number values for 500, 1000, and 2000 transmissions are shown in Tables IV, V , and VI, respectively. These tables contain the mean and standard deviation of the number of transmissions for the sink nodes neighbor nodes and the nodes that are not neighbors to the sink node. The numbers for both our modified LOADng and the standard LOADng protocols are included for comparison. For the modified LOADng protocol, the sink node was within one standard deviation of the mean number of transmissions for its neighbor nodes for all cases tested. The number of sink-node transmissions in the standard LOADng protocol was never within one standard deviation of the mean number of transmissions for its neighbor nodes.
B. RREP to RREQ Ratio
In addition, sink-node anonymity was achieved for the ratio of RREPs sent to RREQs forwarded. The results shown in Table VII are from the same simulations as those in Tables IV, V and VI for the respective number of transmissions. This demonstrates that the modified LOADng protocol meets our criteria for sink-node anonymity for both the number of transmissions and the ratio of RREPs sent to RREQs forwarded. The standard LOADng protocol is not shown because only the sink node sent RREPs in that scenario, meaning the ratio for all other nodes is zero.
C. PDR
The PDR for modified LOADng is moderately lower (2%-5% on average) than standard LOADng in the uniform spacing and random distributions, respectively. These results are shown in Table VIII .
D. Power Usage
We found that the mean ratio of power usage between the modified LOADng and LOADng was 4.48:1, demonstrating a dramatic increase in power usage. The main cause of the increase in power is the additional flooding of RREQ packets for route discovery required for modified LOADng. From the Ratio row in Table IX , we see that the ratio for power usage decreases as the simulations get longer (i.e., more transmissions). In longer simulations, the RREQs are a lower proportion of the total transmissions, resulting in fewer collisions proportional to time. As the simulation progresses, there are fewer RREQs and, correspondingly, fewer collisions, thereby decreasing average power usage.
VII. CONCLUSION
Current sensors employed by the USMC are bulky and complicated to deploy. There are small and inexpensive COTS devices that can fulfill the need for easily deployable wireless sensors. This paper was motivated by a desire to enable sinknode anonymity on these computationally restricted devices with minimal change to the standard communication protocol for the sensor nodes. Our modified LOADng method achieves sink-node anonymity while preserving the lightweight nature of LOADng for the standard sensor nodes in the network. However, a minor tradeoff in power consumption was seen. Despite this tradeoff, we added a level of cybersecurity that is not found in the standard LOADng protocol. In our future work, we will study optimized flooding and optimized jitter to minimize collisions and thereby decrease power usage in all cases.
